Bava Kamma 102 - February 12, 3 Adar 1

Today's daf is sponsored by Hinda Herman in loving memory of her mother, Ethel Rosenthal's yahrzeit. "Among the many mitzvot my mother performed, the mitzvah of Hachnasat Orchim was most dear to her. We miss you every day!!" Baruch Matir Asurim. Today's daf is dedicated to the continued good health of the two hostages rescued last night, Fernanado Marman and Louis Har. We continue to pray for the safe return of all the others. Does intent play a role in determining whether or not fruits have the sanctity of the shmita year, kedushat shviit? If wood is cut for firewood, since it is consumed before one benefits from it, it does not have the kedushat shviit in the shmita year, as is it different from food where one benefits as it is consumed. However if one cuts wood for heat or to make a flame, as its benefit comes with its consumption, does it have kedushat shviit? On the other hand, since wood is generally cut for firewood, is all wood treated as if it was cut for firewood, regardless of the intent? This issue is a subject of debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Yosi regarding different uses for wine. Rabbi Yosi rules that if grapes are picked for other uses, such as for soaking flax, where the benefit is after its consumption, the fruits do not have kedushat shviit, and can therefore be used for soaking flax and other uses. However, intent only plays a role if it is a use that is needed by everyone. If it is a use that is only for sick people or only for wealthy people, then even according to Rabbi Yosi, intent does not play a role and the fruits will have kedushat shviit. Rav Huna ruled like Rabbi Yehoshua ben Karcha on one issue and like Rabbi Yehuda in our Mishna. Rav Yosef heard his rulings and got upset at him for stating the obvious regarding Rabbi Yehuda as there is a rule that if there is a debate in one Mishna and then an unattributed (stam) Mishna states one of the opinions, it is clear we rule by that opinion. Since Rabbi Yehuda's ruling appears in Bava Metzia, the next Masechet, it is clear that we rule like Rabbi Yehuda. If so, how did Rav Huna explain the need to issue that ruling? If one hires a messenger to buy a type of grain and the messenger buys a different type, what is the law? Two braitot bring two different rulings and Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elazar disagree on how to reconcile the two. Is it the same debate as between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda in our Mishna or are both according to Rabbi Meir but each braita is referring to a different purpose of the agency - in one it was for eating and in the other for investment/resale purposes. In Israel, they raised a difficulty with Rabbi Yochanan's interpretation explaining one of the braitas like Rabbi Yehuda - how could the sale be valid as the seller intends to sell it to the agent, not knowing the agent is buying for someone else, and the agent is not acting as an agent, as the agent is purchasing a different item than the one the buyer wanted? Rabbi Abahu explains why there is a distinction regarding this issue when the agent performs the action requested and when the agent doesn't perform the action requested and brings a tanaitic source to prove it. Rabbi Abba rejects his proof and two difficulties are raised against his rejection until he modifies his statement and succeeds in rejecting Rabbi Abahu's proof.